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-Y::-;-
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HORACE F. TAYLOR, doing 
Business as 
TAYLOR MOTOR SER-Y'ICE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs- Civil Case No. 
KENNETH B. :MURRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
-vs-
CHARLES P. STUART, 
Tlu· rd Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
7570 
On the 27th day of October, 1949 and prior thereto, 
Charles P. Stuart was the owner of, and in possession 
of a 1941 Hudson automobile and certificate of title 
thereto. On said date the defendant, Kenneth B. Murray, 
was the owner of a 1949 Packard automobile, subject 
to a conditional sales contract with the Lockhart Fin-
ance Company, having a balance due thereon of $2100.00, 
upon which contract the plaintiff Taylor was a co-
signer. Murray was using this Packard as a "demon-
strator'' in his work as a salesman for plaintiff. 
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Prior to October 27, 1949, :Murray had on several 
occasions approached Stuart for the purpose of selling 
the Murray Packard to Stuart but had never been able to 
reach a satisfactory agreernent as to the terms of the 
sale including the trade-in credit to be allowed Stuart 
on the 1941 Hudson Stuart was to turn in on the pur-
chase price of the Packard (tr. 82-83). On October 27, 
1949 Murray called on Stuart at his farm in Wellsville, 
Utah, at which time Stuart offered to purchase Mur-
ray's Packard as follows: 
''If you want my car on a trade on your car for 
$550.00, go get in it and drive out". (tr. 83) 
which offer was accepted by Murray as follows: 
"Okay, Charlies, I'm just going to make you a 
trade today", (tr. 83) 
whereupon a written contract was signed for the pur-
chase by Stuart of the Murray Packard for $2975.00, not 
including the sales tax, and a credit was allowed on the 
Hudson automobile to Stuart of $550.00 (tr. 83, Pltf's. 
Ex. 1). After this contract was signed and at the direc-
tion of Murray, Stuart deposited the certificate of reg-
istration and the Certificate of Title to the Hudson 
in the front seat of the Hudson and later that day 
:Murray returned to the Stuart residence and drove the 
Hudson away, taking it to his headquarters at the 
Taylor garage for repairs and to be placed in condi-
tion for resale, where he ordered parts and directed 
their installation in order to put the Hudson in a condi-
tion for resale (tr. 84). 
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The Certificate of Regi8tration and Certificate of 
Title and the contraet were taken to the Ta~·lor garage, 
where jf urray maintained his headquarters, and exhib-
ited to Taylor who observed that the Certificate of Title 
had not been signed by Stuart (tr. 97). A few days 
later and between the dates of October 27, 1949, and 
November 9, 1949, ·Murray took the Certificate of Title 
to \Yells ville and obtained the signature of Stuart there-
on and then returned it to the Taylor garage and 
placed it with the other papers (tr. 97-99) where it 
remained until these papers were returned to Murray 
at the direction of Taylor on the evening of November 
9, 1949 ( tr. 92). In the meantime Murray had taken 
his Packard to Charles :Miller for repair of a minor 
blemish on the body, for which he personally paid the 
sum of $11.50 and returned it to the Taylor garage, 
for the usual servicing preparatory to delivery to 
Stuart. This was done abou·t October 29, 1949, and then 
told Ta~·lor his Packard was ready for delivery to 
Stuart when he came after it; that the papers were all 
clamped together and Murray asked Taylor to complete 
the transaction with Stuart ( tr. 91) when he came after 
the Packard. 
On K ove1nber 9, 1949 ::\Iurray was out of the garage 
and Mr. Stuart and wife came after the ~1urray Packard 
( tr. 91 161). At this time Taylor sold Stuart a different 
Parkard off the show-room floor after a discussion of 
the contract with l'tfurray and Stuart drove the new 
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Packard away that evening. 
Upon the return of Murray later that evening he 
was advised by one of Taylor's employees of the sale 
to Stuart of a different Packard, an altercation followed 
and :Murray terminated his services with Taylor . :Jiur-
ray dmnanded a return to him of the Certificates of 
Registration, Title and the contract of sale. They were 
delivered to him upon rraylor's direction (tr. 92). 
Shortly after this incident Murray returned to the 
Taylor garage and drove his Hudson away and took 
it to his residence at Wellsville, Utah. Several demands 
were made upon him to return the Hudson, but Murray 
refused, claiming to be the owner thereof and the Certif-
icate of Title ( r. 52, 53, 94, 95). Taylor then sent a 
couple of his men to Wellsville after the Hudson and re-
n1oved it from the Murray premises without Murray's 
consent, knowledge, or approval, against his will and 
after Murray had forbidden him to take it. This was 
done by making electrical connection to start the motor 
since Murray had refused to deliver or surrender the 
key to Taylor ( tr. 53). Taylor thereafter sold the Hud-
son to one John Bybee (tr. 47) and later wrecked 
(tr. 209). 
Through the interference by Taylor with Murray's 
contract with Stuart and the consequence breach of 
the contract by Stuart, Murray was forced to default 
on his payments to the Lockhart Finance Company and 
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they required hin1 to put his Packard in storage at 
the Taylor garage and then, without notice to Jf nlTa~r, 
Taylor paid off the balance of the conditional sales 
contract, took title in his own name and sold the l\f urray 
Packard, retaining the entire proceeds of the sale for 
himself. 
Upon ~Iurrays refusal to surrender the Certificate 
of title to the Hudson, Taylor con1menced this action 
against defendant :Jiurray, in Claim and Delivery to re-
cover the Certificate of Title ( tr. 1). Defendant answer-
ed and counter-claimed in Claim and Delivery seeking 
possession of Hudson automobile, also in conversion for 
actual damages and attorney fees and a third counter-
claim seeking to recover his equity in the Packard auto-
mobile in the possession of Taylor through his manipula-
tions ( tr.4-5). The plaintiff Taylor, answered the counter 
claims of the defendant. Plaintiff admits that Stuart 
entered into a contract with Murray for the sale of the 
Murray Packard and the trade-in of the Hudson but 
alleged that he rescinded or repudiated said contract 
and so informed ~furray, because of fraud; admits that 
he took the Hudson automobile from the premises of 
:\r urray and alleges that he had no knowledge of Mur-
rys claim to ownership or possession thereof ( tr. 6-10). 
When Taylor set up fraud between Murray and Stuart 
the defendant filed a Third-Party complaint against 
~tuart seeking damages, general and special for breach 
of the contract by Stuart (tr. 12-16), to which Stuart 
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6 
answered generally, incorporating the plaintiff's an-
swer to defendant's counter-claims and adopting them 
as his own, including the alleged fraud (tr. 17, 18). 
Both plaintiff and Third Party defendant (respon-
dents) having admitted the contract and having set up 
fraud in the inducement of the contract between Mur-
ray and Stuart, it was agreed and stipulated between 
<·ounsel that the case should be submitted on the ques-
tion of fraud only and the verdict of the jury would 
control the liability of the parties except as to the 
question of law as to whether the $150.00 attorney fee 
could be allowed for defending the Claim and Delivery 
action (tr. 46-48). 
At the conclusion of the evidence the Court submit-
ted the case to the jury on the question of fraud but 
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury which found no 
fraud ( tr. 31) and in direct disregard thereof, the 
Court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
entered Judgment against the defendant and appellant 
and in favor of the plaintiff and Third Party defendant 
(respondents) (tr. 33-40), from which this appeal is 
taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPEL-
LANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL OF 
JUDGl\iENT 
A. The Court erred in making and entering its 
Findings of Fact numbers First, Second Third, Fifth, 
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except FiYe-A. Sixth, SeYPn, Eight, Nine and its Con-
clusions of Law nun1bers One, Two and Three. 
B. The Court erred in Inaking and entering its 
Judgment and the whole thereof. 
C. The Court erred in refusing to enter judgment 
in favor of the defendant and Third-Party plaintiff, 
the appellant, on his first counter-claim, for the value 
of the Hudson or on his second-clailn in conversion and 
on his third counter-claim for his interest in the Packard 
automobile for $875.00. 
D. The Court erred in refusing to give judgment 
of Third-Party plaintiff, and against the Third-Party 
defendant for the sum of $150.00 attorney fees, costs 
and $875.00 for breach of contract. 
ARGV~fENT 
Point A. 
It is the position of _t\ppellant that the stipulation 
of the parties through their counsel, at the very out-
set of this case ( tr. 46-48) as to the issues of the case, 
the alleged fraud on the part of Appellant, and the 
special findings of the jury (Answers One, Two and 
Four, Tr. 31) and the understanding of the Court of 
that stipulation (tr. 199) as recorded as follows: 
''If the jury finds there was no fraud and ans-
wers these questions against you, then as I under-
stand the purport of the original stipulation, 
then in that event you're (they're, our correc-
tion) entitled to damages against you, which 
the Court will . . . . . '', 
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is determinative of this case, save and except the legal 
question as to whether attroney fees can be awarded 
as damages against a party to a contract, whose breach 
of his conti·act gives rise to litigation between the other 
party and a third party. 
It -is further the position of Appellant that the 
decisive questions raised by Appellant's Statement of 
Points can substantially be sumarized under the fol-
lowing general propositions : 
a. With whom was Stuart doing Business~ 
b. What was the subject-matter of the transactions~ 
c. What did Stuart expect to get~ 
d. What did Stuart expect to give~ 
e. Was there a contract fully executed~ 
f. Was there fraud in the inducement of the con-
tract~ 
Under proposition a. there can be no doubt that Stu-
art was doing business with Kenneth B. Murray, and his 
is a recognized fact both in the testimony and the 
pleading (tr. 6 Parag. 3). Answer to Defendant's 
Counter-Claim wherein respondent Taylor pleaded as 
follows, in substance: That Stuart and Murray entered 
into negotiations for the purchase and sale of the Mur-
ray Packard, "***That in order to induce the said 
Charles Stewart to ENTER INTO SAID CONTRACT" 
the defendant made certain false representations and 
that upon discovery of said misrepresentations, Charles 
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Stewart ''REPUDIATED ANY AGRE:BJl\fEN" which 
he intended to 1nake with this defendant and so inform-
ed the defendant of such REPt'DIATION". (tr. 7). 
The falsity of this allegation comes fron1 the mouth 
of respondent Stuart, himself when he testified: 
"Q. Did you ever tell ~fr. lVIurray that he had 
misrepresented the car to you~ 
A. I don't know as I ever seen Mr. Murray after 
that time. I tried to get in touch with him, but 
he was always a step ahead of us. 
Q. But you never did talk to Mr. Murray about 
this automobile did you~ 
A. I never had a chance to talk to him". (tr. 163). 
Also again (tr. 164. 165). 
'' Q. Well, I just asked you just a minute ago if 
you ever complained to him in any way, and now 
you say you did~ 
A. I never complained until I went to settle the 
deal in the garage. I never detected****. 
Q. But you never complained to Mr. Murray1 
A. No." 
These allegations and admissions were also adopted 
and realleged by Third-Party Defendant, Stuart in hi8 
Answer of Third-Party Defendant (tr. 18.) The evi-
dence is also conclusive, and admits of no doubt that 
Stuart was doing business with Kenneth B. nfurray and 
sueh was known and understood not only by the parties 
themselves but by the employes of Taylor also. 
Taking the evidence in the sequence given at the 
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trial for the c onvenience of the Court and the writer, 
Mr. Taylor admits he knew of ·Murray trying to sell 
the Murray Packard to Stuart (tr. 57) and again (tr. 
58) : 
"Q. So you knew then that Mr. Murray had been 
negotiating with Mr. Stuart for the sale of his 
automobile~ 
A. Yes, Sir. For HIS automobile' 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, I KNEW THAT". 
And again, a moment later: 
''A. He had the WRITTEN CONTRACT in his 
Sales book". (tr. 58). 
Taylor knew in October that .Murray was negotiat-
ing for the sale of his Packard (tr. 59). Taylor knew 
on November 9, 1949 when Stuart came to the Taylor 
garage that Stuart came after the lHURRAY Packard 
( tr. 60, 69), further, when Stuart came to the Garage 
he looked the Murray Packard over, and then according 
to Taylor said: ( tr. 61) "I'm supposed to buy ... ". 
then apparently remembering the necessary facts to 
support his claim, began to stammer and finally admit-
ted: "***and his wife says they wouldn·'t have the 
automobile", and then Taylor siezed upon the opportun-
ity to cut Murray out of the sale of his Packard and 
sell a "Taylor" Packard. (tr. 195, 197). 
When the 1941 Hudson of Mr. Stuart was brought 
in, Taylor admits he knew it was a trade-in ( tr. 68) 
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and that he also knew Stuart had not purchased a new 
Packard. How then did he know 1 Shnply because he 
had seen, and had in his possession the ~I urray-Stuart 
co;ntract. 
Kenneth B. ~lurray testified with respect to the 
transaction between hin1self and Stuart. To set out this 
testimony here would only add volume to these remarks 
,\·hen we feel the Court wil~ readily see that the position 
of the Appellant is definitely established by Respond-
ent's own testimony. 
Herman Nelson, an employee of respondent Taylor, 
knew of the sale of the :Murray Packard to Stuart: 
(tr. 137) 
''A. ***I remember Ken coming in ·one night and 
saying he had sold his car and left the order 
and the title and that he was going some place 
and would Mr. Taylor take care of the deal when 
these people came in''. 
And that the title and order were left with Taylor Motor 
Service. Further, Nelson testified that the Stuarts 
came to the Taylor garage to get the MURRAY PACK-
AHD. 
Stuart, the respondent, testified that he begun deal-
ing with Murray in September of 1949 and that Murray 
then had a Packard automobile (tr. 155). rrhen immedi-
ately folowing this testimony respondents' own counsel 
asked this question of Stuart : 
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"Q. WHEN WAS THIS DEAL FINALLY 
CONSUMATED~'' 
The answer was October 27, 1949. Stuart then testified 
that he had seen the Packard Murray was driving; 
that he and Murray finally came to an agreement to 
which Murray had already testified ( tr. 157); that the 
price was right; the trade-in was right; that he knew 
the Packard had been used as a "demonstrator". and 
again ( tr. 158) that " The con tract is alright" and then 
again charges misrepresentation and fraud. 
Stuart also testified (tr. 161) "I made arrange-
ments to buy KEN'S CAR if a '50 model, yes", and 
again at page 161 Stuart admits that he came to pick 
up KENS l\1URRA Y 'S automobile. 
To further establish the existence of an intent to 
do business with Murray, Stuart testified (tr. 164)) 
"My understanding was that his figures were right 
here. I would have taken the car if it had been what 
it should have been". 
There can be no doubt but what Stuart came to 
the Taylor garage fully intending to perform the balance 
of his contract with Murray and would have done so 
had it not been for the intervention of Taylor who was 
anxious to sell a new automobile ( tr. 161-163) and it is 
n1ore than evident, we think, that the defects in the 
automobile alleged, the misrepresentations claimed and 
the deceit perpetrated are only synthetic to avoid the 
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consequences of a breach of the contract with l\I urray. 
At least our belief is supported by the verdict of the 
jury who also found to the smue effect. 
rraylor testified that when Stuart caine to his gar-
age he encouraged him to go see :J[ urray and make things 
right with hiln before he purchased another Packard off 
the floor (tr. 60, 62). If neither Taylor or Murray 
thought there was an agreement on the MURRAY car 
then how can these conversations be explained 1 Con-
sidering the evidence, all from Respondents' own wit-
nesses, the conclusions seems inescapable that Stuart 
was doing business with Kenneth B. Murray, knew it, 
understood it, and that conclusion cannot be avoided 
either by the Court or counsel, since the question of the 
execution of the contract was put squarely before the 
jury upon Stuart's claim that Murray tampered with the 
contract after he had signed it in "blank", yet Stuart 
still admits "rrhe contract is alright". (tr. 158) and that 
the contract bears Kenneth B. Murray's name as the 
seller, Stuart's name as the buyer and is the same way 
it was drawn when Stuart signed it. 
Proposition b. must be too obvious to admit of 
argument. The Kenneth B. Murray Packard was the 
subject-matter of the contract. From testimony already 
quoted ,the price was right the trade-in was right, the 
car purchased and listed on the contract was the specific 
Packard described by motor and serial number and 
belonging to Murray ,it was purchased as a ''demonstra-
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tor", Stuart came to get that specific automobile, and 
would have taken it, so he admits, IF IT HAD BEEN 
AS REPRESFjN'rED. 
To read the testimony would seem to make the 
an~wer to proposition c. evident. Stuart expected to get 
the Murray "demonstrator" agreed upon and described 
in his written contract with Murray. He came after it 
and would have taken it if SOMETHING had not 
changed his mind. Stuart and Taylor claim it was fraud 
and misrepresentation yet Stuart testified that it was 
Taylor who called his attention to the alleged misrep-
resentations when, Stuart came for the Murray Packard 
( tr. 161-163) and then Taylor sold Stuart another Pack-
ard off the floor. 
What did Stuart expect to give~ Proposition d. 
Here again the contract "that is alright" (tr.158) speaks 
for itself. Stuart agreed and the ''price is okay ( tr. 
157) to pay $2975.00 exclusive of taxes, for -the automo-
bile of :Murray's and to receive a credit of $550.00 on that 
price for his 1941 Hudson automobile as a trade-in. 
When the deal was '' Consun1ated'' he delivered the 
Hudson, its Certificate of Registration and Certificate 
of Title to Murray at the time the contract was signed 
( tr. 83). This part of his contract he performed and 
his performance can only be considered as performance 
pursu..ant to the contract. ,No other explanation can be, or 
was given. 
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A reading of the record itself fully answers proposi-
tion d. .\ written contract was fnll~· executed and 
partially perfonned and so considered by the respond-
enh~ in their pleadings and testimony (Deft's :B~x. 1, tr. 
6, 7, 17). In objeeting to a question on cross-exalnina-
tion, Respondent's coun:.-el 1nade the following state-
ment (tr. 64): 
• · :Jl r. Preston: I object to that as improper 
cross-examination, as no bearing on this case. 
This is a deal between Mr. Murray, in which 
:Jiurray represented this is a 1949 Packard, and 
those people, if they've been defrauded, I immag-
ine they'll sue Mr. Taylor". 
At page 155 Stuart testified that the deal had been 
''consumated" on October 27, 1949. He further testi-
fied: "The contract is alright" ( tr. 157) but alleges 
and testified that when the contract was signed it was 
blank. If the contract had been blank, which contention 
the jury found to be untrue ( tr. 31) would not this be 
sufficient to constitute a ratification or adoption~ 
Stuart acknowledges the contract was as agreed upon 
and that he would have taken the Murray Packard but 
for the alleged misrepresentations which the jury found 
were not made ( tr. 31, 35). 
Taylor also acknowledges the contract as follows 
(tr. 197): 
''I could have kept that title after they brought 
it in. I could have did that. I could have kept that 
title and all it would have been is a contract. I 
wanted to do the right thing". 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The Court itself, recognized the contract and that 
defendant should recover judgment in the absence of 
fraud (tr. 199.). The jury found there was no fraud. 
Next proposition: Was there fraud~ The case was 
tried on the theory there was a contract which had been 
repudiated because of fraud (tr. 46, 47) and the Court 
so understood ( tr. 199). The jury found no fraud ( tr. 31, 
35) and the Court so found and adopted and approved 
the findings of the jury on this point ( tr. 35). 
We submit the only answers that can be logically 
made to the propositions listed above are: 
a. Murray 
b. Kenneth B. Murray's Packard. 
c. Kenneth B. Murray's Packard. 
d. The total sum of $2975.00 plus taxes for which 




Turning more specifically to Appellants Statement 
of ·Points, we submit the Court was in error in finding 
that plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the im-
Inediate possession of the Certificate of Title to the 
1941 Hudson automobile. (Finding First, tr. 35) and 
that plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the 
Hudson automobile and for failing to find instead of 
said finding that the defendant was the owner of and 
entitled to the immediate possession of both the Hud-
son and its Certificate of Title. 
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Finding Second (tr. 34) the Court is in error for 
the reason set out above. 
Finding Third (tr.34). The Court is in error in 
that the finding is incomplete and should have stated 
fully and fairly that ~I urray and Stuart entered into 
a written contract for the purchase and sale of the 
:Jlurray Packard, "·hich contract was fully executed 
and partly performed. 
Finding Fourth (tr. 34) is subject to the observa-
tions above and further that this finding is squarely 
contrary to respondents' pleading, theory and evi-
dence and a further reason the Court is in gross error, 
we feel, the intent of Stuart at the tirne of the sign-
ing of the certificate of title is wholly immaterial, since 
by his own testirnony, he signed the certificate of title, 
which by inadventacne he failed to sign when it was 
delevered to :Murray, AFTER STUART HAD 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT WITH MURRAY 
AND AFTER HE HAD PURCHASED A NEW PACK-
ARD FROM TAYLOR. (tr. 168). 
Finding Fifth (tr. 34). The only finding that could 
be made was that through the default of Stuart, Murray 
was required to put his Packard in storage at the in-
stance of the Lockhart Finance Company until the deal 
with Stuart was straightened out ( tr. 124-127) and then 
without notice to Murray of any kind, Taylor obtained 
title thereto by paying off the conditional sales con-
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tract and resold the Murray Packard and retained the 
proceeds. At least there would have been no trouble 
with the finance company hut for the breach of the con-
tract by Stuart. 
That notwithstanding the verdict of the jury and 
in disregard thereof, and while paying lip-service to 
the verdict of the jury in its Finding Five-A. (tr. 35) 
the Court found fraudulent representations were made 
Finding Sixth (tr. 36) which in fact deceived Stuart 
and that Stuart's breach of the contract was justified. 
Appellant further submits that the Court's Finding 
Seven ( tr. 37) is beyond any issue joined, beyond the 
evidence and squarely contrary to the evidence and con-
trary to any thory upon which said case was tried; is 
far beyond the prepared decree of Counsel for re-
spondents as appears from the papers in the record 
itslf (tr. 36-38) and is an issue and findings injected into 
this case by the Court itself in an attempt to justify its 
other erroneous Findings. We further submit that this 
finding is i1nmaterial and contrary to law and is not 
sufficient upon which to base any legal conclusion or 
judgment. 
In connection with the Court's Finding Eight (tr. 
37) Appellant submits said finding is grossly contrary 
to the evidence in the case and respectfully requests 
counsel for respondent to point out any issue on their 
part tendered, where· any· demand or request was ever 
titade or where there· is a single syllable of testimony 
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in the record, either believable or unbelievable whre 
any lack of tender of title played any part in this trans-
action or any alleged justification for Stuart's failure 
to abide by his contract. Failure or prospective failure 
of consideration is an affirmative defense and unless 
pleaded is waived. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8C. 
But_ the Court recognizing the understanding of the 
parties, and explaining their actions found in said 
findings (tr. 37) "***the most that ~Iurray ever did in 
this respect was to n1ake it possible for Mr. Stuart to 
obtain possession only****'' This finding, like find-
ing Seven, is an attempt on the part of the Court to 
create and inject an issue the parties themselves never 
considered worthy of injection into the case and is 
another effort to justify or support its erroneous Find-
ings, Conclusions and Judgment entered in this cause. 
The Court finds that Stuart thought he was dealing with 
Taylor and even if this was true, it would be immaterial 
for the reason that this is a written contract fully ex-
ecuted and partially performed and admitted by the 
only person who could complain, to be "alright" and 
found by the jury to have been fully completed when 
signed and now the Court, on its own initiative and in 
total disregard for the writing itself, attempts to avoid 
the writing containing the names of the specific con-
tracting parties, the specific property and the specific 
price by raising issues and making findings upon which 
there are no pleadings, issue or evidence and which 
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Stuart seeks to avoid because of ''fraud'' found NOT 
to exist by the jury, and then the Court (tr. 201) 
notifies the parties that it will not be bound by the find-
ings of the jury on the issues submitted unless they 
conform to the pleasure of the Court. 
Even Counsel for Respondents recognized the effect 
and result of the Findings of the jury in his Motion to 
Set Aside Y erdict and for Judgment and in his mis-
concieved Alternative Motion For a New Trial (tr. 32) 
which he withdrew after determining the intentions and 
"personality" (tr. 204) of the Court (tr. 210). 
If the Court is wrong, and we submit it is, in mak-
ing its Finding of Fact, then it follows that it is wrong 
in each of its Conclusions of Law. And again Conclusion 
One is a finding of fact which is in error for lack 
of evidence and the purported conclusion is contrary 
to law and is in disregard of the evidence and the written 
contract. Conclusions Two and Three are also in error 
for the reasons heretofore argued. Taylor never did 
become the owner of or entitled to the possession of the 
Hudson automobile but attempted to rest his claim upon 
the alleged weakness of the right and title of defendant 
which weakness the jury found not to exist. 
Points B. C. and D. 
Any judgment entered upon such erroneous Find-
ing of Fact and Conclusions of law to back it up, is as 
erroneous as the Findings and Conclusions upon which 
it is based. 
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Under the evidence Appellant is entitled to judg-
ment against Taylor for $550.00 and costs for the reason 
the Hudson was sold by Taylor to one John Bybee before 
the trial of the case and wrecked by :J1r. Bybee. This 
judgment could be entered on either defendant's FirF;t 
or Second Counter-clai1ns. Defendant (Appellant) 
should be awarded judgment against Taylor for $875.00 
and co~t~ on Appellant's third -Counter-claim as the 
value of Appellants interest in the Packard automobile 
obtained through the manipulations of Taylor. 
Appellant should be awarded judgments against 
Third-Party defendant and Respondent Stuart for 
$2975.00 less the $2100.00 owing on the Murray Packard 
and less any judgment defendant recovered against Tay-
lor. Defendant and Appellant is entitled to the stipu-
lated $150.00 attorney fee against Stuart for breach of 
his contract which occasioned the necessity of defend-
ant's defending against Taylor's Claim and Delivery 
action. But in this connection we respectfully request 
this court to remand the cause to the District Court for 
re-determining the value of the services of counsel in the 
light of these proceedings. 
Counsel fees and costs are legitimate items of 
damage in a case such as this where the breach of con-
tract by one party thereunto which occasions litigation 
between the other party to the contract and a third 
party. 
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15 A. J. 552, parag. 144 
17 C. J. 809, parag. 135. 
1 Rest. Contracts, 531 Parag. 334. 
Rules of ·civil Practice, Rule 8. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion we submit that a reading of the 
testimony, a review of the pleadings, the issues 
drawn therefrom, the theory upon which the case 
was tried and submitted and the understanding of -
those issues by the Court as expressed by it,- and of 
Counsel will convince this Court that the District 
Court was in error in its Finding of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and the Judgment it entered and the case 
should be reversed and remanded with directions to 
enter judgment in favor of Appellant and against the 
Respondents and to leave the question of special dam- _ 
ages to the Appellant open for further testimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARRINER M. MORRISON · 
H. A. Sjostrom 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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